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Same-Sex Marriages: Legal Issues 
Summary 
The recognition of same-sex marriages generates debate on both the federal and state levels. State 
legislators in Vermont and New Hampshire have legalized same-sex marriages. At the same time, 
federal and state courts are beginning to address the validity of statutory and constitutional 
provisions limiting marriage to heterosexual couples. State courts in New Jersey, Massachusetts, 
California, Connecticut, and Iowa have held that denying gay and lesbian couples the right to 
marry violates their state constitution. Some state courts have also found that domestic 
partnership/civil union laws are not the constitutional equivalent of civil marriage. These 
variations raise questions concerning the validity of such unions outside the contracted 
jurisdiction and have bearing on the distribution of federal benefits. 
Questions regarding same-sex marriages figure prominently in California. After the state supreme 
court’s decision finding that denying same-sex couples the right to marry violated the state 
constitution, voters approved a constitutional amendment (“Proposition 8”) limiting the validity 
and recognition of “marriages” to heterosexual couples. Subsequent court challenges ensued. In 
Strauss v. Horton (207 P.3d 48 (CA 2009)), the California Supreme Court found that Proposition 
8 is a properly enacted limited constitutional amendment. However, the court found that the 
amendment applies only prospectively, and does not affect the estimated 18,000 same-sex 
marriages that occurred prior to the amendment’s passage. Proposition 8 opponents subsequently 
challenged the amendment on constitutional grounds. On August 4, 2010, a federal court judge in 
the Northern District of California found that Proposition 8 violates both the equal protection and 
due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger (2010 WL 
3025614 (N.D. Ca. August 4, 2010)), the court found that the federal constitutional right to marry 
applies equally to same-sex couples and that Proposition 8 is not rationally related to any 
legitimate government purpose. This is the first time a federal court has recognized such a right. 
Currently, federal law does not recognize same-sex marriages. The Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), P.L. 104-199, prohibits federal recognition of same-sex marriages and allows 
individual states to refuse to recognize such marriages performed in other states. Section 3 of 
DOMA requires that marriage, for purposes of federal benefit programs, must be defined as the 
union of one man and one woman. As federal agencies grapple with the interplay of DOMA and 
the distribution of federal marriage-based benefits, lower courts are beginning to address the 
DOMA’s constitutionality. On July 8, 2010, a U.S. District Court in Massachusetts found section 
3 of DOMA unconstitutional in two companion cases (Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 
699 F.Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) and Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010)) brought by same-sex couples married in 
Massachusetts. At issue were a myriad of benefits. In one case, the court found that DOMA 
exceeded Congress’s power under the Spending Clause and violated the Tenth Amendment. In the 
other case, the court held that Congress’s goal of preserving the status quo did not bear a rational 
relationship to DOMA and thus, violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. It is 
unclear whether the government will appeal either of these cases. 
This report discusses DOMA and legal challenges to it. It reviews legal principles applied to 
determine the validity of a marriage contracted in another state and surveys the various 
approaches employed by states to enable or to prevent same-sex marriage. This report also 
examines House and Senate resolutions introduced in previous Congresses proposing a 
constitutional amendment and limiting federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear or determine any 
question pertaining to the interpretation of DOMA. 
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Introduction 
Massachusetts became the first state to legalize marriage between same-sex couples on May 17, 
2004, as a result of a November 2003 decision by the state’s highest court that denying gay and 
lesbian couples the right to marry violated the state’s constitution.1 Similarly, state supreme courts 
in New Jersey,2 California,3 Connecticut,4 and Iowa5 found that denying same-sex couples the 
right to marry violated their state constitutions. In addition, the California, Connecticut, and Iowa 
courts found that parallel statutory structures, including domestic partnerships and/or civil unions, 
were not the constitutional equivalent of civil marriage. However, in New Jersey, the court left 
open the option for the state legislature to provide a parallel statutory structure which would 
allow same-sex couples to enjoy the same rights, privileges, and burdens as married opposite-sex 
couples.6 While the aforementioned states legalized same-sex marriages judicially, on April 7, 
2009, Vermont became the first state to legalize same-sex marriages legislatively. State legislators 
garnered a sufficient number of votes to override the governor’s veto. Similarly, governors in 
Maine7 and New Hampshire signed bills legalizing same-sex marriages. 
Currently federal law does not recognize, nor does any state law other than Vermont, Maine, and 
New Hampshire affirmatively allow gay or lesbian couples to marry. On the federal level, 
Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to prohibit recognition of same-sex 
marriages for purposes of federal enactments. States, such as Alabama,8 Alaska, Arkansas,9 
Arizona,10 California,11 Colorado,12 Florida,13 Georgia,14 Hawaii, Idaho,15 Kansas,16 Kentucky,17 
Louisiana,18 Michigan,19 Mississippi,20 Missouri,21 Montana,22 Nebraska,23 Nevada, North 
1
 Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
2
 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006). 
3
 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Ca. 2008). 
4
 Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d. 407 (Conn. 2008). 
5
 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
6
 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006). 
7
 In November 2009, voters overruled the law. 
8
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on June 6, 2006. 
9
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
10
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 4, 2008. 
11
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 4, 2008. This vote appears to overrule the California State 
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Ca. 2008) granting same-sex couples the right to 
marry. On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court found the ban was a permissible and valid amendment under 
the state’s constitution. However, the court unanimously held that the amendment applies prospectively and not 
retroactively. As such, the court upheld same-sex marriages entered into before the amendment’s passage. Strauss v. 
Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Ca. 2009). 
12
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 7, 2006. 
13
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 4, 2008. 
14
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
15
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 7, 2006. 
16
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on April 5, 2005. 
17
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
18
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on September 18, 2004. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a state district 
judge’s ruling striking down the amendment on the grounds that it violated a provision of the state constitution 
requiring that an amendment cover only one subject. The Court found that each provision of the amendment is germane 
to the single object of defense of marriage and constitutes an element of the plan advanced to achieve this object. 
(continued...) 
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Dakota,24 Ohio,25 Oklahoma,26 Oregon,27 South Carolina,28 South Dakota,29 Tennessee, 30 Texas,31 
Utah, Virginia,32 and Wisconsin33 have enacted state constitutional amendments limiting marriage 
to one man and one woman. Seventeen other states have enacted statutes limiting marriage in 
some manner.34 Tabl e 1 summarizes these various approaches. 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)35 
In 1996, Congress approved the DOMA “[t]o define and protect the institution of marriage.” It 
allows all states, territories, possessions, and Indian tribes to refuse to recognize an act of any 
other jurisdiction that designates a relationship between individuals of the same sex as a marriage. 
In part, DOMA states: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to 
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated 
as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or 
claim arising from such relationship.36 
(...continued) 
Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 893 So.3d 715 (La. 2005). Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a 
lower court’s ruling. Perdue v. O’Kelley, 280 GA 732 (GA. 2006). Other states that also have single-subject 
requirements, Ohio and Oklahoma, may face similar legal challenges. 
19
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
20
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
21
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on August 3, 2004. 
22
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
23
 A U.S. district court judge struck down Nebraska’s ban on gay marriage, saying that the ban “imposes significant 
burdens on both the expressive and intimate associational rights” of gays “and creates a significant barrier to the 
plaintiffs’ right to petition or to participate in the political process.” Citizens for Equal Protection Inc., v. Bruning, 368 
F.Supp.2d 980 (D. NE May 12, 2005). However, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed finding that the Nebraska’s 
constitutional amendment “and other laws limiting the state-recognized institution of marriage to heterosexual couples 
are rationally related to legitimate state interest and therefore do not violate the Constitution of the United States.” 
Citizens for Equal Protection Inc., v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
24
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
25
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
26
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. 
27
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 2, 2004. On April 4, 2005, the Oregon Supreme Court 
invalidated Multnomah County same-sex marriages, stating that the marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples 
without authority and were void at the time they were issued. Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005). 
28
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 7, 2006. 
29
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 7, 2006. 
30
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 7, 2006. 
31
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 8, 2005. 
32
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 7, 2006. 
33
 Voters approved the constitutional ban on November 7, 2006. 
34
 These states are Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 
35
 P.L. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C). 
36
 28 U.S.C. §1738C. 
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Furthermore, DOMA goes on to declare that the terms “marriage” and “spouse,” as used in 
federal enactments, exclude same-sex marriage. 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or 
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the 
word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a 
wife.37 
Constitutional Challenges to DOMA38 
Full Faith and Credit Clause 
Some argue that DOMA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s authority under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution,39 which states: 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the 
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. 
37 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
38
 It should be noted that a federal bankruptcy court in the Western District of Washington found DOMA constitutional. 
Two American women, married in British Columbia, Canada filed a joint bankruptcy petition in Tacoma, challenging 
the definitional part of DOMA. The court ruled that there was no fundamental constitutional right to marry someone of 
the same sex and that DOMA did not violate the Fourth, Fifth or Tenth amendments, nor the principles of comity. In re 
Lee Kandu and Ann C. Kandu, No. 03-51312 (Western District of Washington, August 17, 2004). This decision is not 
binding on other courts. 
In Wilson v. Ake, a same-sex couple sought a declaration that their marriage was valid for federal and Florida law 
purposes. To issue such a declaration, the court would have had to invalidate both the federal DOMA and the Florida 
statutes defining marriage the same way and expressly forbidding courts to recognize same-sex marriages from other 
states. The Wilson court declined to invalidate any of the relevant statutes finding that (1) DOMA did not violate the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause; (2) the right to marry a person of the same sex was not a fundamental right guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause; (3) homosexuals were not a suspect class warranting strict scrutiny of equal protection claim; 
(4) under a rational basis analysis, DOMA did not violate equal protection or due process guarantees; and (5) the 
Florida statute prohibiting same-sex marriage is constitutional. Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.3d 1298 (M.D. Florida 
2005). Moreover, the Wilson court found that it was bound by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. Nelson, 
191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
In Baker v. Nelson, two adult males’ application for a marriage license was denied by the county clerk because the 
petitioners were of the same sex. The plaintiffs appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Plaintiffs argued that 
Minnesota Statute § 517.08, which did not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex, violated the First, 
Eighth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs’ 
assertion that “the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties is a fundamental right of all persons” and held 
that § 517.08 did not violate the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause. 191 N.W.2d at 186-87. 
The plaintiffs appealed the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1257(2). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the Supreme Court has discretion to refuse to adjudicate the case on its merits. The 
Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeal “for want of a substantial federal question.” Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. 
The Wilson court, relying on Hicks v. Miranda (422 U.S. 332 (1975)), found that a dismissal for lack of a substantial 
federal question constitutes an adjudication on the merits that is binding on lower federal courts. 
39
 U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1. 
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Opponents argue that, although Congress has authority to pass laws that enable acts, judgments 
and the like to be given effect in other states, it has no constitutional power to pass a law 
permitting states to deny full faith and credit to another state’s laws and judgments.40 Conversely, 
some argue that DOMA does nothing more than simply restate the power granted to the states by 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.41 While there is no judicial precedent on this issue, Congress’s 
general authority to “prescribe ... the effect” of public acts arguably gives it discretion to define 
the “effect” so that a particular public act is not due full faith and credit. Thus, plain reading of 
the clause appears to encompass both expansion and contraction.42 
Equal Protection 
Congress’s authority to legislate in this manner under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, if the 
analysis set out above is accepted, does not conclude the matter. There are multiple constitutional 
constraints upon federal legislation. One that is relevant is the Equal Protection Clause in the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans,43 
which struck down a referendum-adopted provision of the Colorado Constitution, which repealed 
local ordinances that provided civil-rights protections for gay persons and which prohibited all 
governmental action designed to protect gays and lesbians from discrimination. The Court held 
that, under the Equal Protection Clause, legislation adverse to homosexuals was to be scrutinized 
under a “rational basis” standard of review.44 The classification failed to pass even this deferential 
standard of review, because it imposed a special disability on homosexuals not visited on any 
other class of people and it could not be justified by any of the arguments made by the state. The 
state argued that its purpose for the amendment was two-fold: (1) to respect the freedom of 
association rights of other citizens, such as landlords and employers who objected to 
homosexuality; and (2) to serve the state’s interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination 
against other protected groups. 
DOMA can be distinguished from the Colorado amendment. DOMA’s legislative history indicates 
that it was intended to protect federalism interests and state sovereignty in the area of domestic 
relations, historically a subject of almost exclusive state concern. Moreover, it permits but does 
not require states to deny recognition to same-sex marriages in other states, affording states with 
strong public policy concerns the discretion to effectuate that policy. Thus, it can be argued that 
DOMA is grounded not in hostility to homosexuals but in an intent to afford the states the 
discretion to act as their public policy on same-sex marriage dictates. 
In Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,45 a U.S. District Court in Massachusetts found that 
section 3 of DOMA failed to pass constitutional muster under the highly deferential rational basis 
40
 See 142 Cong. Rec. S5931-33 (June 6, 1996) (statement introducing Professor Laurence H. Tribe’s letter into the 
record concluding that DOMA “would be an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to limit the full faith and credit 
clause of the Constitution.”). 
41
 See Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 
1996, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 604, 621-35 (1997). 
42
 See e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d at 1302 (finding that DOMA was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power 
to regulate conflicts between the laws of different states, and holding otherwise would create “a license for a single 
State to create national policy.”). 
43
 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
44
 Id. 
45
 699 F.Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
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analysis.46 In this case, same-sex couples married in Massachusetts challenged DOMA alleging 
that they were denied certain federal marriage-based benefits available to similarly-situated 
heterosexual couples. The benefits sought encompassed three programs: (1) the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHB), the Federal Employees Dental and Vision 
Insurance Program (FEDVIP), and the federal Flexible Spending Arrangement Program. 
In reaching its decision, the court looked to the DOMA’s legislative history, which identified four 
interests that Congress sought to advance in the law’s enactment: (1) encouraging responsible 
procreation and child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional 
heterosexual marriage, (3) defending traditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce 
resources.47 The court found that these interests do not bear a rational basis upon which to 
exclude same-sex marriages from federal recognition as procreation is not a precondition of 
marriage.48 Nor, does the non-recognition of same-sex marriages encourage such individuals to 
marry opposite-sex partners or strengthen heterosexual marriages. According to the court, “mere 
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable [by the 
government] are decidedly impermissible basis upon which to ground a legislative 
classification.”49 
The government proffered additional arguments which the court discounted. The court found that 
there was no interest in providing a uniform definition of marriage for purposes of determining 
federal rights. The court noted that the federal government has “fully embraced” the myriad of 
state marriage laws by “recognizing as valid for federal purposes any heterosexual marriage 
which has been declared valid pursuant to state law.”50 The court found persuasive the fact that 
the DOMA represented the first time that the federal government attempted to mandate a uniform 
definition of marriage. As in Romer, the district court concluded that the absence of precedent for 
this legislative classification demonstrated an hostility toward same-sex couples. And animus 
alone is not a legitimate basis for the government to act.51 In addition, the court concluded that 
“there exists no fairly conceivable set of facts that could ground a rational relationship between 
DOMA and a legitimate government objective.”52 
Substantive Due Process (Right to Privacy) 
Another potential constitutional constraint is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,53 which struck 
down under the Due Process Clause a state statute criminalizing certain private sexual acts 
between homosexuals. The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process privacy 
guarantee extends to protect consensual sex between adult homosexuals. The Court noted that the 
Due Process right to privacy protects certain personal decisions from governmental interference. 
46
 The court declined to address whether classification based on sexual orientation warrants heightened scrutiny. 
47
 H.R. Rep. 104-664, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-18. 
699 F.Supp. 2d 374. 
Id. at 389. 
Id. at 390. 
48 
49 
50 
51
 Id. at 396. 
52
 Id. at 387. It is unclear whether the government will appeal the decision. 
53
 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For a legal analysis of this decision, refer to CRS Report RL31681, Homosexuality and the 
Constitution: A Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Lawrence v. Texas, by Jody Feder. 
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These personal decisions include issues regarding contraceptives, abortion, marriage, procreation, 
54 
and family relations.  The Court extended this right to privacy to cover adult consensual 
homosexual sodomy. 
It is currently unclear what impact, if any, the Court’s decision in Lawrence will have on legal 
challenges to laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. On the one hand, this decision can be viewed 
as affirming a broad constitutional right to sexual privacy. Conversely, the Court distinguished 
this case from cases involving minors and “whether the government must give formal recognition 
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”55 Courts may seek to distinguish 
statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage from statutes criminalizing homosexual conduct. Courts 
may view the preservation of the institution of marriage as sufficient justification for statutes 
banning same-sex marriage. Moreover, courts may view the public recognition of marriage 
differently than the sexual conduct of homosexuals in the privacy of their own homes.56 
Tenth Amendment and Spending Power 
Another potential constitutional constraint is the Tenth Amendment coupled with the Spending 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution limits congressional 
authority to act by specifying general subject categories where federal action is permissible. 
Under this section and the Tenth Amendment,57 categories other than those enumerated in Section 
8 or elsewhere are reserved for state action. Enumerated powers encompass those topics the 
Constitution’s framers thought could be best handled on the national level; for example, waging 
war, national defense, interstate and foreign commerce, coinage and currency, the postal system, 
bankruptcies, copyrights, and the federal judicial system. Generally, family law issues, including 
“declarations of status, e.g., marriage, annulment, divorce, custody and paternity,”58 are deemed 
to fall within a state’s purview.59 
In instances where Congress lacks a direct justification for federal legislation, it often relies on its 
enumerated spending power. Article I, Section 8, clause I empowers Congress “to lay and collect 
Taxes … to provide for the … general Welfare.” There is a general consensus that Congress has 
expansive powers to attach conditions to grants of federal money, including grants to states. In 
South Dakota v. Dole,60 the Supreme Court considered a federal law that required the Secretary of 
Transportation to withhold 5% of a state’s federal highway dollars if the state allowed persons 
54
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
55
 Id. at 2484. See e.g., Wilson v. Ake, 354 F.Supp.2d at 1306 (declining to interpret Lawrence as creating a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage). 
56
 As the discussion of state courts’ reasoning on this issue, discussed below, indicates, state constitutions – not the U.S. 
Constitution – are generally the source of interpreting laws governing marriage. To date, only the Arizona Court of 
Appeals has considered the impact of Lawrence. Even then, it did not interpret the case as proscribing state law 
banning same-sex marriage. 
57
 The Tenth Amendment provides that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 
58
 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992)(Blackmun, J., concurring). 
59
 See, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 848 (1997)(stating that “[as a general matter, ‘the whole subject of the 
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the 
United States.’”); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906)(stating that “[n]o one denies that the States, at the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution, possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce [and that] the 
Constitution delegated no authority to the Government of the United States on [that subject].”). 
60
 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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under 21 years of age to purchase alcoholic beverages. South Dakota, which allowed 18-year-olds 
to make such purchases and was in a position to lose federal funds for highway construction, 
sued, arguing that the highway funding law was unrelated to setting a national drinking age. In 
upholding the federal law, the Court announced a four-part test to evaluate the constitutionality of 
conditions attached to federal spending programs: (1) the spending power must be exercised in 
pursuit of the general welfare, (2) the grant conditions must be clearly stated, (3) the conditions 
must be related to a federal interest in the national program or project, and (4) the spending power 
cannot be used to induce states to do things that would themselves be unconstitutional.61 
In Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,62 a federal district court found that 
DOMA exceeded Congress’s power under the Spending Clause and violated the Tenth 
Amendment. Specifically, the court found that DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on 
the receipt of federal funding and intrudes on an “attribute of state sovereignty”—namely the 
regulation of marital status. Massachusetts challenged DOMA’s constitutionality where the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) informed the Commonwealth’s Department of Veterans’ 
Services that the federal government was entitled to recapture grant money if the Commonwealth 
entombed same-sex spouse of veterans at two state veterans’ cemeteries (owned and operated 
solely by the Commonwealth). 
In finding that Congress exceeded the scope of its authority by enacting DOMA, the district court 
first found that DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As in its 
companion case, the court found that DOMA failed to pass constitutional muster under the highly 
deferential rational basis analysis. Additionally, the court concluded that “DOMA plainly 
conditions the receipt of federal funding on the denial of marriage-based benefits to same-sex 
married couples, though the same benefits are provided to similarly-situated heterosexual 
couples.”63 Accordingly, the court found that such an action exceeds Congress’s authority under 
its spending power.64 
Interstate Recognition of Marriage 
DOMA opponents take the position that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would obligate states to 
recognize same-sex marriages contracted in other states in which they are authorized. This 
conclusion is far from evident as this clause applies principally to the interstate recognition and 
enforcement of judgments.65 It is settled law that final judgments are entitled to full faith and 
credit, regardless of other states’ public policies, provided the issuing state had jurisdiction over 
the parties and the subject matter.66 The Full Faith and Credit Clause has rarely been used by 
courts to validate marriages because marriages are not “legal judgments.” 
Questions concerning the validity of an out-of-state marriage are generally resolved without 
reference to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In the legal sense, marriage is a “civil contract” 
61
 Id. at 207-11. 
62
 698 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D. Mass. 2010). 
63
 Id. at 348. 
64
 Id. 
65
 See H.Rept. 104-664, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 (stating that “marriage licensure is not a judgment.”). See also, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 (defining which acts, records and judicial proceedings are afforded full faith and credit). 
66
 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 107. 
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created by the state which establishes certain duties and confers certain benefits.67 Validly 
entering the contract creates the marital status; the duties and benefits attached by a state are 
incidents of that status. As such, the general tendency, based on comity rather than on compulsion 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, is to recognize marriages contracted in other states even if 
they could not have been celebrated in the recognizing state. 
The general rule of validation for marriage is to look to the law of the place where the marriage 
was celebrated. A marriage satisfying the contracting state’s requirements will usually be held 
valid everywhere.68 Many states provide by statute that a marriage that is valid where contracted 
is valid within the state. This “place of celebration” rule is then subject to a number of exceptions, 
most of which are narrowly construed. The most common exception to the “place of celebration” 
rule is for marriages deemed contrary to the forum’s strong public policy. Several states, such as 
Connecticut,69 Idaho,70 Illinois,71 Kansas,72 Missouri,73 Pennsylvania,74 South Carolina,75 and 
Tennessee76 provide an exception to this general rule by declaring out-of-state marriages void if 
against the state’s public policy or if entered into with the intent to evade the law of the state. This 
exception applies only where another state’s law violates “some fundamental principle of justice, 
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.”77 
Section 283 of the Restatement (Second) of Law provides: 
(1) The validity of marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with 
respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the 
marriage under the principles stated in § 6. 
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was 
contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy 
of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage 
at the time of the marriage. 
67
 On the state level, common examples of nonnegotiable marital rights and obligations include distinct income tax 
filing status; public assistance such as health and welfare benefits; default rules concerning community property 
distribution and control; dower, curtesy and inheritance rights; child custody, child agreements; name change rights; 
spouse and marital communications privileges in legal proceedings; and the right to bring wrongful death, and other 
legal actions. 
68
 See 2 Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283. 
69
 Conn. Gen Stat. Ann. § 45a-803-4. 
70
 Idaho Code § 32-209. 
71
 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/201. 
72
 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-101. 
73
 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.022. 
74
 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 23 § 1704. 
75
 S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10. 
76
 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113. 
77
 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918)(defining public policy as a valid reason for closing the 
forum to suit); see e.g. Shea v. Shea, 63 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1945)(finding that a common law marriage validly 
contracted in another state should not be recognized in New York, where common law marriage was prohibited by 
statute). 
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Same-Sex Marriage Activity in the States 
State Litigation 
Massachusetts 
Massachusetts, unlike 26 states and the federal government, has not adopted a “defense of 
marriage statute” defining marriage as a union between a man and woman.78 On April 11, 2001, a 
Boston-based, homosexual rights group, Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (GLAD) 
filed suit against the Massachusetts Department of Public Health on behalf of seven same-sex 
couples. The plaintiffs claimed that “refusing same-sex couples the opportunity to apply for a 
marriage license” violates Massachusetts’ law and various portions of the Massachusetts 
Constitution. GLAD’s brief argued the existence of a fundamental right to marry “the person of 
one’s choosing” in the due process provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution and asserted that 
the marriage laws, which allow both men and women to marry, violate equal protection 
provisions.79 
The Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments after exploring the application of the word 
marriage, the construction of marriage statutes and finally, the historical purpose of marriage. The 
trial court found that based on history and the actions of the people’s elected representatives, a 
right to same-sex marriage was not so rooted in tradition that a failure to recognize it violated 
fundamental liberty, nor was it implicit in ordered liberty.80 Moreover, the court held that in 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage, the Commonwealth did not deprive them of 
substantive due process, liberty, or freedom of speech or association.81 The court went on to find 
that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples was rationally related to a legitimate state interest 
in encouraging procreation.82 
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court overruled the lower court and 
held that, under the Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth could not deny the 
protections, benefits, and obligations attendant on marriage to two individuals of the same sex 
who wish to marry.83 The court concluded that interpreting the statutory term “marriage” to apply 
only to male-female unions lacked a rational basis for either due process or equal protection 
purposes under the state’s constitution. Moreover, the court found that such a limitation was not 
justified by the state’s interest in providing a favorable setting for procreation and had no rational 
relationship to the state’s interests in ensuring that children be raised in optimal settings and in 
conservation of state and private financial resources.84 The court reasoned that the laws of civil 
marriage did not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse, nor contain any requirement that 
78
 It should be noted that, prior to the Goodridge case, in Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E. 2d 315 (Mass. 1993), the 
Supreme Judicial Court had interpreted “marriage” to mean “the union of one man and one woman.” 
79
 Hillary Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Suffolk County, Super. Ct. May 7, 2002). 
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 Hillary Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
84
 Id. at 964 (stating that it “cannot be rational under our laws, and indeed is not permitted, to penalize children by 
depriving them of state benefits because the state disapproves of their parents’ sexual orientation.”) 
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applicants for marriage licenses attest to their ability or intention to conceive children by coitus. 
Moreover, the court reasoned that the state has no power to provide varying levels of protection to 
children based on the circumstances of birth. As for the state’s interest in conserving scarce state 
and private financial resources, the court found that the state failed to produce any evidence to 
support its assertion that same-sex couples were less financially interdependent than opposite-sex 
couples. In addition, Massachusetts marriage laws do not condition receipt of public and private 
financial benefits to married individuals on a demonstration of financial dependence on each 
other.85 As this decision is based on the Commonwealth’s constitution, it is not reviewable by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. The court stayed its decision for 180 days to give the Legislature time to 
enact legislation “as it may deem appropriate in light of this opinion.”86 
On February 3, 2004, the court ruled, in an advisory opinion to the state senate, that civil unions 
are not the constitutional equivalent of civil marriage.87 The court reasoned that the establishment 
of civil unions for same-sex couples would create a separate class of citizens by status 
discrimination which would violate the equal protection and due process requirements of the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth.88 
“Marriage” Versus Domestic Partnership or Civil Union: Standards of Review 
In the years following the Massachusetts decision, state supreme courts in New Jersey, California, 
Connecticut, and Iowa addressed the issue of same-sex marriage.89 The California and 
Connecticut cases posed a slightly different question than the one presented in Massachusetts and 
Iowa, as California and Connecticut legislatures enacted parallel statutory schemes in the form of 
domestic partnerships and civil unions granting the states’ same-sex couples the same rights and 
benefits as well as the obligations of civil marriage. As such, the legal issue before the California 
and Connecticut supreme courts was whether, in light of both marriage and domestic 
partnership/civil union statutes, the failure to designate the official relationship of same-sex 
couples as marriage violates the states’ constitutions.90 Likewise, courts in Connecticut and Iowa 
found that civil unions are not equivalent to marriage. 
California 
While the California Supreme Court held that the privacy, due process, and equal protection 
provisions of the state’s constitution guarantee the basic right of civil marriage to all individuals 
and couples regardless of their sexual orientation,91 the Connecticut and Iowa supreme courts 
85 
86 
Id. at 965. 
Id. at 968. 
87
 The state Senate asked the court whether it would be sufficient for the legislature to pass a law allowing same-sex 
civil unions that would confer “all of the benefits, protections, rights and responsibilities of marriage.” 
88
 Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, SJC-01963, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004). 
89
 As these decisions are based exclusively on state constitutional provisions, they are non-reviewable by the United 
States Supreme Court. 
90
 See, Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008)(stating “... because the institution 
of marriage carries with it a status and significance that the newly created classification of civil unions does not 
embody, the segregation of heterosexual and homosexual couples into separate institutions constitutes a cognizable 
harm.”). 
91
 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008). 
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focused on the equal protection provision of their state constitutions.92 In addressing the privacy 
and due process challenges, the California majority first looked at the nature and scope of the 
“right to marry.” Relying on judicial precedent and legislative history,93 the court concluded that 
the fundamental nature of the substantive rights embodied in the right to marry, and their central 
importance to one’s opportunity to live a happy, meaningful, and satisfying life as a full member 
of society, require that the state constitution be interpreted to protect this right not to be 
“eliminated or abrogated by the Legislature or by the electorate through the statutory initiative 
process.”94 In reaching its conclusion, the court discussed the societal benefits of marriage, 
including child welfare and the role that marriage plays in “facilitating a stable family setting.”95 
Furthermore, the court described marriage as the “basic unit” or “building block” of society.96 The 
court noted that while marriage serves a vital societal interest, judicial precedent also 
demonstrated that the right to marry is an “integral component of an individual’s interest in 
personal autonomy” protected by the privacy and liberty interest provisions of the California 
constitution.97 
While the California court acknowledged that the constitutional right to marry did not obligate the 
state to afford specific tax or other governmental benefits on the basis of a couple’s family 
relation, the right to marry does “obligate the state to take affirmative action to grant official, 
public recognition to the couple’s relationship as a family.”98 Thus, the court concluded that the 
California constitution guarantees same-sex couples the same “substantive constitutional rights as 
opposite-sex couples to choose one’s life partner and enter with that person in a committed, 
officially recognized, and protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally 
based incidents of marriage.”99 
In addressing the equal protection question, the California Supreme Court used a different 
standard of review than the Connecticut and Iowa supreme courts. In a matter of first impression, 
the California Supreme Court determined that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of 
review for sexual orientation discrimination. According to the California court, classification or 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is analogous to race, gender,100 or religious 
discrimination, as these types of classifications are based on characteristics that bear no 
relationship to one’s ability to perform or contribute to society.101 As such, the California court 
92
 Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 
2009)(stating “ ... a new distinction based on sexual orientation would be equally suspect and difficult to square with 
the fundamental principles of equal protection embodied in our constitution.”). 
93
 See, 183 P.3d 384, 407-410 (discussing the legislative history of marriage statutes). 
94
 Id. at 399. 
95
 Id. at 423. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. at 433. 
100
 Under the federal law, classification or discrimination based on gender is subject to intermediate scrutiny as opposed 
to strict scrutiny. However, California courts have employed strict scrutiny analysis, thus guaranteeing greater 
protection against gender discrimination. For example, in Woods v. Horton, the court employed a strict scrutiny 
analysis in finding unconstitutional a state statute that funded certain domestic violence programs only for female 
victims and their children. 84 Cal.Rptr. 3d 332 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. October 14, 2008). 
101
 See, 183 P.3d 384, 444 (rejecting the argument that a group’s current political powerlessness is a prerequisite in the 
classification of “suspect” class by stating that “it would be impossible to justify the numerous decisions that continue 
to treat sex, race, and religion as suspect classifications.”). 
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expanded protection against sexual orientation discrimination by determining that strict scrutiny 
was the appropriate review. 
Under the heightened standard of strict scrutiny, the state had to establish (1) a compelling state 
interest, and (2) that the differential treatment was necessary to achieve the compelling state 
interest. The court concluded that the designation of “marriage” would not have an impact on 
opposite-sex couples. However, the court concluded that a separate and differently named family 
for same-sex couples would be harmful to the couples as well as their offspring due to a possible 
perception that such a union is of a “lesser stature” in comparison to relationships of opposite-sex 
couples. The court concluded that the state’s domestic partnership law provides insufficient 
protections to same-sex couples. Specifically, the court stated that “[r]etaining the designation of 
marriage exclusively for opposite-sex couples and providing only a separate and distinct 
designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of perpetuating a more general 
premise—now emphatically rejected by this state—that gay individuals and same-sex couples are 
in some respects ‘second-class citizens.’” As such, the court found such a distinction 
unconstitutional under the California constitution. 
Presumably in reaction to the California Supreme Court’s holding, on November 4, 2008, 
California voters approved a constitutional amendment (Proposition 8) limiting the validity and 
recognition of “marriages” to heterosexual couples. This constitutional amendment appears to be 
intended to overrule the California Supreme Court’s decision. However, legal challenges were 
filed seeking injunctive relief against the amendment’s implementation. On November 19, 2008, 
the court denied the requests for injunctive relief. However, the court agreed to decide three 
issues regarding Proposition 8’s validity and/or retroactivity, including (1) whether Proposition 8 
was a constitutional amendment or revision, (2) the validity of the initiative process itself, and (3) 
whether Proposition 8 itself is retroactive, applying to existing same-sex marriages.102 
On May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court concluded that Proposition 8 is a properly 
enacted limited constitutional amendment, not a constitutional revision requiring a two-thirds 
vote of the legislature to be placed before voters.103 The court noted that precedent establishes the 
criteria for determining whether a constitutional change constitutes a revision rather than an 
amendment. A court must assess “(1) the meaning and scope of the constitutional change at issue, 
and (2) the effect – both quantitative and qualitative – that the constitutional change will have on 
the basic governmental plan or framework embodied in the preexisting provisions of the 
California Constitution.”104 Concluding that Proposition 8 is a constitutional amendment, the 
court analyzed its quantitative and qualitative effect on the preexisting provisions of the state 
constitution and reasoned that the amendment does not repeal or abrogate same-sex couples’ 
constitutional rights of privacy and due process or fundamentally alter “the meaning and 
substance” of equal protection principles recognized in the court’s previous ruling pertaining to 
same-sex marriage and in laws allowing civil unions. Instead, the court stated that 
[t]he measure carves out a narrow and limited exception to the state constitutional rights, 
reserving the official designation of the term ‘marriage’ for the union of opposite-sex couples 
as a matter of state constitutional law, but leaving undisturbed all of the other extremely 
102
 Strauss v. Horton, No. S168047/S168066/S168078 (Ca. Nov. 19, 2008). 
103
 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Ca. 2009). Under the California constitution, the initiative process may be used to 
propose and adopt constitutional amendments but may not be used to revise the state constitution. 
104
 Id. at 61. 
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significant aspects of a same-sex couple’s state constitutional right to establish an officially 
recognized and protected family relationship and the guarantee of equal protection of the 
laws.105 
Unlike its previous decision, the court did not explicitly address whether a parallel structure, such 
as a civil union, would maintain same-sex couples’ constitutional privacy, due process, and equal 
protection rights. However, it might be inferred from the court’s characterization of Proposition 
8106 that it now believes that a parallel structure would comport with constitutional requirements. 
In addressing the status of same-sex marriages performed before Proposition 8’s passage, the 
court unanimously found that the amendment applies prospectively. The court noted that ending 
such marriages would be akin to “throwing property rights into disarray, destroying the legal 
interests and expectations of thousands of couples and their families, and potentially undermining 
the ability of citizens to plan their lives according to the law as it has been determined by the 
state’s highest court.”107 As such, the court held that such marriages remain valid and must 
continue to be recognized within the state.108 
On August 4, 2010, a U.S. district court for the Northern District of California found that 
Proposition 8 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution’s 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.109 In deciding the Due Process question, the court 
considered two issues: (1) what type of right did the plaintiffs seek to exercise and (2) the 
appropriate standard of review. The threshold issue was whether the plaintiffs sought to exercise 
the fundamental right to marry or if they were seeking recognition of a new right. After 
considering the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that the plaintiffs sought the 
former. Following a similar analysis to the California Supreme Court, the district court concluded 
that marriage has retained certain characteristics throughout history including the requirement 
that two parties give their free consent to form a relationship, which then forms the foundation of 
a household.110 The court found that the evidence shows that there has been a “movement of 
marriage away from a gendered institution and toward an institution free from state-mandated 
gender roles.” 
The district court concluded that as the plaintiffs sought to exercise their fundamental right to 
marry, the appropriate standard for analysis would be strict scrutiny. However, instead of applying 
this analysis, the court found that Proposition 8 could not withstand a substantially lower standard 
of “rational basis” review citing similar factors articulated by previous state courts. As to the strict 
scrutiny analysis, the court stated that: 
105
 Id. 
106
 As noted earlier in this report, the court concluded that Proposition 8 as a constitutional amendment merely defined 
the term “marriage” as officially used within the state and, therefore, did not fundamentally alter “a same-sex couple’s 
... right to establish an officially recognized and protected family relationship.” Id. 
107
 Id. at 121. 
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 In the aftermath of Strauss, at least one complaint has been filed in district court seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief alleging that Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
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 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. C. 09-2292 VRW, 2010 WL 3025614 , *1(N.D. Ca. August 4, 2010). 
110
 Id. at *67. 
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the minimal evidentiary presentation made by proponents does not meet the heavy burden of 
production necessary to show that Proposition 8 is narrowly tailored to a compelling 
government interest. Proposition 8 cannot, therefore, withstand strict scrutiny. 111 
In addressing the equal protection claim, the court declined to address whether laws classifying 
on the basis of sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of review despite 
opining that such should be required. Instead, the court found that Proposition 8 does not survive 
rational basis, citing the same reasons as previous state courts.112 Additionally, the court noted: 
An initiative measure adopted by the voters deserves great respect…. When challenged, 
however, the voters’ determinations must find at least some support in evidence. This is 
especially so when those determinations enact into law classifications of persons. 
Conjecture, speculation and fears are not enough. Still less will the moral disapprobation of a 
group or class of citizens suffice, no matter how large the majority that shares that view. The 
evidence demonstrated beyond serious reckoning that Proposition 8 find support only in such 
disapproval.113 
The court’s determination that denying the right to same-sex marriage warrants a heightened level 
of review may affect other laws related to discrimination based on sexual orientation. While the 
decision is currently limited, the rationale may be applied in other state challenges. It appears that 
this decision will be appealed, albeit by the intervenors (proponents of Proposition 8), not the 
state. There appears to be some question whether the intervenors have the requisite standing to 
appeal.114 It is unclear whether the U.S. Supreme Court would accept the case for review on the 
merits as it pertains to an interpretation of a state constitutional amendment. Moreover, in the 
absence of a circuit split, the Court may decline to review the matter. 
The Connecticut and Iowa supreme courts agreed with the California Supreme Court’s finding 
that laws discriminating against homosexuals must be subjected to a higher level of scrutiny. 
However, these courts declined to use a strict scrutiny analysis. Instead, the courts used a variety 
of factors to determine that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect class analogous to gender, thus 
warranting an intermediate scrutiny analysis.115 In exploring the nature of homosexual identity, 
the history of societal views regarding homosexuality, and the limitation of political power 
possessed by homosexuals, the courts found that homosexuals suffered a history of invidious 
discrimination based on characteristics not within their control that bear “no relation to [their] 
ability to perform or contribute to society.”116 Therefore, the courts concluded that homosexuals 
are a quasi-suspect class requiring the state to advance a sufficiently persuasive justification for 
denying same-sex couples the right to marry. As in the Massachusetts and California decisions, 
111
 Id. at *69. 
112
 Id. at *74-79. 
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 Id. at *12. 
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 Plaintiffs must suffer a concrete or discernible injury. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 552 
(1992)(finding that a group of environmental organizations lacked standing to challenge regulations enforcing parts of 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986)(finding that an anti-abortion doctor 
lacked any judicially cognizable interest in state abortion law). 
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 It was also a matter of first impression for the Connecticut court to classify sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect 
class. 
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 Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407, 425 (Conn. 2008). 
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the Connecticut and Iowa supreme courts rejected the state’s justifications of promoting 
uniformity and preserving the traditional definition of marriage.117 
N e w Jersey 
Similarly, on October 25, 2006, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state’s constitution 
requires that same-sex couples be granted the same legal rights as married heterosexual couples. 
However, the court declined to label those rights and instead ordered the state legislature to 
amend its marriage statutes or enact a new statutory scheme granting the state’s same-sex couples 
the rights of married couples within 180 days.118 
In its 4-3 decision,119 the majority separated the plaintiffs’ equal protection argument into two 
questions: (1) whether committed same-sex couples have a constitutional right to the benefits and 
privileges afforded to married heterosexual couples and (2) if so, whether they have the 
constitutional right to have their permanent committed relationship recognized by the name 
“marriage.”120 In addressing the first question, the court discussed New Jersey’s recent history of 
passing laws providing benefits to same-sex couples. For example, the state forbids sexual 
orientation discrimination and allows same-sex couples to become foster parents as well as adopt 
children. The court concluded that the state’s statutes and judicial opinions provide committed 
same-sex couples with a strong interest in equality of treatment.121 Moreover, the court concluded 
that although the state’s Domestic Partnership Act provided same-sex couples with some 
important rights, the act failed to “bridge the inequality gap between committed same-sex couples 
and married opposite-sex couples.”122 
The court held that the state has no legitimate interest in denying the benefits and privileges of 
marriage to same-sex couples.123 In assessing the public need for denying committed same-sex 
couples the full benefits and privileges that flow from marriage, the court rejected the state’s 
argument of uniformity with other states and concluded that the disparate treatment of committed 
same-sex couples directly disadvantages their children. Moreover, the court concluded that there 
“is no rational basis for, on the one hand, giving gays and lesbians full civil rights in their status 
as individuals, and, on the other, giving them an incomplete set of rights when they follow the 
inclination of their sexual orientation and enter into committed same-sex relationships.”124 As 
such, the court found that denying committed same-sex couples the financial and social benefits 
117
 Id. at 473; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
118
 Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (NJ 2006) (stating that “the name to be given to the statutory scheme that provides 
full rights and benefits to same-sex couples, whether marriage or some other term, is a matter left to the democratic 
process.”). As this decision is based solely on New Jersey’s state constitution, it is not reviewable by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
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 This was an unanimous decision as to providing benefits and protections to same-sex couples. The dissent concurred 
in granting benefits and protections but dissented in that they believed that the name “marriage” was also required. Id. 
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 Id. at 215. 
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 Id. at 218 (stating that “in light of the policies reflected in the statutory and decisional laws of the state, we cannot 
find a legitimate public need for an unequal legal scheme of benefits and privileges that disadvantages committed 
same-sex couples.”). 
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and privileges given to married heterosexual couples bears no substantial relationship to a 
legitimate government purpose. 
However, the court held that there is no fundamental due process right to same-sex marriage 
encompassed within the concept of “liberty” guaranteed by the state constitution. In reaching its 
decision, the court adopted the general standard followed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
construing the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The 
court found that there was no legal or historical basis for same-sex marriage nor anything to 
suggest that the framers of the federal or state constitutions considered it a fundamental right to 
be afforded special protection. The court emphasized the importance of tradition to substantive 
due process analysis—and held that, according to tradition, the right to marry a same-sex partner 
is not “deeply rooted in our nation’s history.”125 As a result, the court declined to find a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Instead, the court ordered the legislature to provide to 
committed same-sex couples the “full rights and benefits enjoyed by heterosexual couples.”126 
The court provided two options to the legislature: (1) amend the marriage statutes to include 
same-sex couples; or (2) enact a parallel statutory structure by another name, in which same-sex 
couples would receive the same rights and benefits as well as the “burdens and obligations of 
civil marriage.”127 
Arizona 
Although the aforementioned opinions deal primarily with a state constitution,128 an Arizona 
Court of Appeals, exercising its discretion to accept jurisdiction based on the issue of first 
impression, held that the fundamental right to marry protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution as well as the Arizona Constitution did not encompass the right to marry a 
same-sex partner.129 Moreover, the court found that the state had a legitimate interest in 
encouraging procreation and child rearing within the marital relationship and limiting that 
relationship to opposite-sex couples. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence, the petitioners argued that the Arizona 
statute prohibiting same-sex marriages violated their fundamental right to marry and their right to 
equal protection under the laws, both of which are guaranteed by the federal and state 
constitutions. The Arizona court rejected the petitioners’ argument that the Supreme Court in 
Lawrence implicitly recognized that the fundamental right to marry includes the freedom to 
choose a same-sex spouse.130 The court viewed the Lawrence language as acknowledging a 
homosexual person’s “right to define his or her own existence, and achieve the type of individual 
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 Id. at 206. 
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 Id. at 223. 
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fulfillment that is the hallmark of a free society, by entering a homosexual relationship.”131 
However, the court declined to view the language as stating that such a right includes the choice 
to enter a state-sanctioned, same-sex marriage.132 
As such, the court reviewed the constitutionality of the challenged statutes using a rational basis 
analysis and found that the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child-
rearing within the marital relationship, and that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples is 
rationally related to that interest. Moreover, the court said that while the state’s reasoning is 
debatable, it is not arbitrary or irrational. Consequently, the court upheld the challenged statutes. 
State “Civil Union” Laws 
Civil union/domestic partnership laws confer certain rights and benefits upon domestic partners, 
which vary depending on state law. Some of these rights and benefits include laws relating to 
title, tenure, descent and distribution, intestate succession; causes of action related to or 
dependent upon spousal status,133 including an action for wrongful death,134 emotional distress, or 
loss of consortium; probate law and procedure; adoption law and procedure; insurance benefits; 
workers’ compensation rights; laws relating to medical care and treatment, hospital visitation and 
notification; family leave benefits; and public assistance benefits under state laws and laws 
relating to state taxes.135 
For example, in Vermont, civil union status136 is available to two persons of the same sex who are 
unrelated137 and affords parties “the same benefits, protections and responsibilities under Vermont 
law, whether they derive from statute, policy, administrative or court rule, common law or any 
other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage.”138 Civil union status is also 
available in Connecticut,139 New Hampshire,140 and New Jersey.141 Domestic partnership laws in 
131
 Id. 
132
 See also, Morrison v. Sadler, 2003 WL 23119998 (Ind. Super. May 7, 2003)(holding that the state’s law “promotes 
the state’s interest in encouraging procreation to occur in a context where both biological parents are present to raise 
the child.”); Lewis v. Harris, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J.Super.L. November 5, 2003)(holding that the right to marry does 
not include a fundamental right to same-sex marriage). 
133
 See Salucco v. Alldredge, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 498 (Mass. Super., 2004)(exercising its general equity jurisdiction to 
dissolve a Vermont civil union). 
134
 See Langan v. St. Vincent Hosp., 196 Misc.2d 440 (N.Y. Misc. 2003)(finding that New York’s statutes did not 
prohibit recognition of a same-sex union nor was such a union against New York’s public policy on marriage thus 
recognizing the same-sex partner as a spouse for purposes of New York’s wrongful death statute), overruled by Langan 
v. St. Vincent Hosp., 802 N.Y.S. 2d 476 (NY AD 2 Dept., 2005). 
135
 Constitutional amendments approved in Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Ohio and Utah contain language which state that a legal status which is substantially similar to marriage (i.e., civil 
unions or domestic partnerships) may not be recognized. 
136
 On April 7, 2009, Vermont state legislators overrode the governor’s veto of a bill legalizing same-sex marriage. It is 
unclear as to whether civil unions will remain available to same-sex couples. 
137
 Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15 §§ 1203, 5163. See also, “The Vermont Guide to Civil Unions,” found at 
http://www.sec.state.vt.us/otherprg/civilunions/civilunions.html. 
138
 Vt. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15 § 1204. See also, Salucco v. Alldredge, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 498 (Mass. Super., 2004)(discussing 
Vermont’s civil union statutes). 
139
 Connecticut’s civil union laws became effective October 1, 2005. A Connecticut civil union is available to an 
individual at least 18 years of age, of the same sex as the other party to the civil union, no more closely related to the 
other than first cousin and not a party to another civil union or marriage. 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 05-10 (S.S.B. 
963). 
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California,142 Hawaii,143 New Jersey,144 Oregon,145 and Washington146 also offer some marital 
benefits to same-sex couples, although not as comprehensive as Vermont’s or Connecticut’s civil 
unions.147 
Congressional Activity 
In recent years, several bills have been introduced to address the issue of same-sex marriage. For 
example, in the 111th Congress, H.J.Res. 37, a proposed constitutional amendment, was 
introduced. Bills were introduced in previous Congresses.148 For example, in the 110th Congress, 
H.J.Res. 22, a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution, was introduced. The text of the 
proposed amendment was as follows: 
Section 1. Marriage in the United States shall consist only of a legal union of one man and 
one woman. 
Section 2. No court of the United States or of any State shall have jurisdiction to determine 
whether this Constitution or the constitution of any State requires that the legal incidents of 
marriage be conferred upon any union other than a legal union between one man and one 
woman. 
(...continued) 
140
 New Hampshire’s civil union laws became effective January 1, 2008. A New Hampshire civil union is available to 
an individual at least 18 years of age, of the same sex as the other party to the civil union, no more closely related to the 
other than first cousin and not a party to another civil union or marriage. N.H. Rev. Stat. §§ 457-A:2-4. 
141
 New Jersey’s civil union laws became effective February 2007. 
142
 CA Fam. §§ 297, 298 and 299(extending the rights and duties of marriage to persons registered as domestic partners 
on and after January 1, 2005). It should be noted that opposite-sex domestic partners over the age of 62 meeting the 
eligibility requirements of Title II of the Social Security Act (SSA) for old age benefits (as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 
402(a)), or Title XVI of the SSA for aged individuals (as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1381) are eligible to register as 
domestic partners. 
143
 Hawaii’s term for domestic partners is “reciprocal beneficiaries.” Reciprocal beneficiaries must be eighteen years 
old, ineligible to marry, and unmarried. This status includes relationships not involving sex or the same residence. Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 572C-5; See also, http://www.hawaii.gov/health/vital-records/vital-records/reciprocal/index.html 
(discussing Hawaii’s reciprocal beneficiary status). 
144
 The New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act became effective July 11, 2004, and grants legal status to same-sex 
couples and unmarried, opposite-sex couples age 62 or over under certain New Jersey laws. 
145
 Oregon’s domestic partnership laws went into effect on January 1, 2008. 
146
 Washington’s domestic partnership laws went into effect on July 22, 2007. 
147
 Domestic partnerships also exist at the local level. For example, New York City allows residents an opportunity to 
register their domestic partnerships provided that both individuals are eighteen years of age or older, unmarried or 
related by blood in a manner that would bar his or her marriage in New York State, have a close and committed 
personal relationship, live together and have been living together on a continuous basis. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-241. 
It should be noted that this statute allows both same-sex and opposite-sex partners to register. 
148
 H.J.Res. 22 was introduced in the 110th Congress. S.J.Res. 1, S.J.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 39 and H.J.Res. 91 were 
introduced in the 109th Congress. On June 7, 2006, the Senate considered and voted on a required procedural motion 
regarding S.J.Res. 1. This motion failed by a vote of 49-48, which prevented further consideration of S.J.Res. 1. In 
addition, H.J.Res. 56, S.J.Res. 26, S.J.Res. 30, S.J.Res. 40, and H.J.Res. 106 were introduced in the 108th Congress. On 
July 14, 2004, the Senate considered and voted on a required procedural motion. This motion failed by a vote of 48-50, 
which prevented further consideration of S.J.Res. 40. On September 30, 2004, the House failed to pass H.J.Res. 106 by 
a vote of 227-186. 
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Section 3. No State shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial 
proceeding of any other State concerning a union between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage, or as having the legal incidents of marriage, under the laws of such 
other State. 
Also introduced in the 110th, H.R. 107 would have defined marriage for all legal purposes in the 
District of Columbia to consist of the union of one man and one woman.149 H.R. 724, introduced 
in January 2007, would have amended Title 28 of the United States Code to limit federal court 
jurisdiction over questions under DOMA.150 
Although national uniformity may be achieved upon ratification of one of the proposed 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution,151 states would no longer have the flexibility of defining 
marriage within their borders. Moreover, states may be prohibited from recognizing a same-sex 
marriage performed and recognized outside of the United States.152 Some of the proposed 
amendments may affect a state’s ability to define civil unions or domestic partnerships and the 
benefits conferred upon such. 
A further complication in the definition of marriage may arise regarding the determination of an 
individual’s gender. As the first official document to indicate a person’s sex, the designation on 
the birth certificate “usually controls the sex designation on all later documents.”153 Some courts 
have held that sexual identity for purposes of marriage is determined by the sex stated on the birth 
certificate, regardless of subsequent sexual reassignment.154 However, some argue that this 
method is flawed, as an infant’s sex may be misidentified at birth and the individual may 
subsequently identify with and conform his or her biology to another sex upon adulthood.155 
Conclusion 
States currently possess the authority to decide whether to recognize an out-of-state marriage. The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause has rarely been used by states to validate marriages because 
marriages are not “legal judgments.” With respect to cases decided under the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause that involve conflicting state statutes, the Supreme Court generally examines the 
significant aggregation of contacts the forum has with the parties and the occurrence or 
transaction to decide which state’s law to apply. Similarly, based upon generally accepted legal 
149
 H.R. 107 was introduced on January 4, 2007. 
150
 H.R. 724 was identical to H.R. 3313, the Marriage Protection Act of 2004, introduced during the 108th Congress. On 
July 22, 2004, the House voted on and passed H.R. 3313. The Senate did not consider the legislation during the 108th 
Congress. H.R. 1100 was introduced in the 109th Congress and contained the same language. 
151
 The proposed constitutional amendment would have to be ratified by three-quarters of the states (either the 
legislatures thereof, or in amendment conventions). 
152
 It appears that the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, South Africa, Norway, and Spain are the only international 
jurisdictions that sanction and/or recognize a same-sex union as a “marriage,” per se. 
153
 Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 265,309 (1999) (discussing biological characteristics and sexual identity). 
154
 See e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W. 3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999); 
but see, M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1976)(determining an individual’s sexual classification for the purpose of 
marriage encompasses a mental component as well as an anatomical component). 
155
 If a mistake was made on the original birth certificate, an amended certificate will sometimes be issued if 
accompanied by an affidavit from a physician or a court order. 
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principles, states routinely decide whether a marriage validly contracted in another jurisdiction 
will be recognized in-state by examining whether it has a significant relationship with the spouses 
and the marriage. Congress is empowered under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution to prescribe the manner that public acts, commonly understood to mean legislative 
acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved and the effect of such acts, records, and 
proceedings in other states.156 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Romer v. Colorado and Lawrence v. Texas may present 
different issues concerning DOMA’s constitutionality. Basically Romer appears to stand for the 
proposition that legislation targeting gays and lesbians is constitutionally impermissible under the 
Equal Protection Clause unless the legislative classification bears a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state purpose. Because same-sex marriages are singled out for differential treatment, 
DOMA appears to create a legislative classification for equal protection purposes that must meet 
a rational basis test. It is possible that DOMA would survive constitutional scrutiny under Romer 
inasmuch as the statute was enacted to protect the traditional institution of marriage. Moreover, 
DOMA does not prohibit states from recognizing same-sex marriage if they so choose. 
Lawrence appears to stand for the proposition that the zone of privacy protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteen Amendment extends to adult, consensual sex between 
homosexuals. Lawrence’s implication for statutes banning same-sex marriages and the 
constitutional validity of the DOMA are unclear. 
Lower courts have begun to address DOMA’s constitutionality. Historically, the federal 
government has deferred to a state’s definition of marriage. However, with the legalization of 
same-sex marriage in several jurisdictions, federal agencies continue to grapple with the interplay 
of DOMA and the distribution of federal marriage-based benefits. Lower courts have found 
DOMA to violate equal protection principles, state sovereignty, and Congress’s authority under its 
spending power. It would appear that there is a possibility that district and/or circuit courts will 
disagree on DOMA’s constitutionality. Such a split could cause changes in the distribution of 
federal marriage-based benefits depending on a same-sex couple’s residence, thus making it more 
likely that one of these cases will reach the U.S. Supreme Court. 
State Constitutional Amendments Limiting 
Marriage to a Man and a Woman 
Alabama 
Marriage is inherently a unique relationship between a man and a woman. As a matter of 
public policy, this state has a special interest in encouraging, supporting, and protecting this 
unique relationship in order to promote, among other goals, the stability and welfare of 
156
 It should be noted that only on five occasions previous to the DOMA has Congress enacted legislation based upon 
this power. The first, passed in 1790 (1 Stat. 122, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738), provides for ways to authenticate acts, 
records and judicial proceedings. The second, dating from 1804 (2 Stat. 298, codified at 28 U.S.C. 1738), provides 
methods of authenticating non-judicial records. Three other Congressional enactments pertain to modifiable family law 
orders (child custody, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, child support (28 U.S.C. § 1738B) and domestic protection (18 U.S.C. § 
2265)). 
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society and its children. A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid 
in this state. 
Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and a woman, which, when the 
legal capacity and consent of both parties is present, establishes their relationship as husband 
and wife, and which is recognized by the state as a civil contract. 
No marriage license shall be issued in the State of Alabama to parties of the same sex. 
The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any marriage of parties of the same sex 
that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction 
regardless of whether a marriage license was issued. 
The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid any common law marriage of parties of the 
same sex. 
A union replicating marriage of or between persons of the same sex in the State of Alabama 
or in any other jurisdiction shall be considered and treated in all respects as having no legal 
force or effect in this state and shall not be recognized by this state as a marriage or other 
union replicating marriage.157 
Arkansas 
Marriage consists only of the union of one man and one woman. Legal status for unmarried 
persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or 
recognized in Arkansas, except that the Legislature may recognize a common law marriage 
from another state between a man and a woman. The Legislature has the power to determine 
the capacity of persons to marry, subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obligations, 
privileges and immunities of marriage.158 
Arizona 
Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as marriage in this 
state.159 
California 
Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid and recognized in California.1 
Colorado 
Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this 
state.161 
2005 Ala. Acts 35. 
AR. CONST. Amend. 83, sec. 1. 
160
 CA CONST. Art. 1, §7.5. 
161
 CO. CONST. Art. II, sec. 31. 
159
 A.Z. CONST. Art. 30. 
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Florida 
Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of only one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, no other legal union that is treated as marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof 
shall be valid or recognized.162 
Georgia 
This state shall recognize as marriage only the union of man and woman. Marriages between 
persons of the same sex are prohibited in this state. No union between persons of the same 
sex shall be recognized by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage. This state shall 
not give effect to any public act, record or judicial proceeding of any other state or 
jurisdiction respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other state or jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have 
no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to any such 
relationship or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties’ respective rights arising as 
a result of or in connection with such relationship.163 
Idaho 
A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid 
or recognized in this state.164 
Kansas 
The marriage contract is to be considered in law as a civil contract. Marriage shall be 
constituted by one man and one woman only. All other marriages are declared to be contrary 
to the public policy of this state and are void. 
No relationship, other than a marriage, shall be recognized by the state as entitling the parties 
to the rights or incidents of marriage.165 
Kentucky 
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage 
in Kentucky. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized.166 
163
 GA. CONST. Art. I., §IV. On May 16, 2006, a state county court stuck down Georgia’s constitutional amendment 
on the grounds that it violated a rule that limits ballot questions to a single subject. O’Kelley, et. al v. Perdue, 
2004CV93494 (Super. Ct. Fulton County, GA May 16, 2006). 
164
 ID CONST. Art. III, § 28. 
165
 KS CONST. Art. 15, § 16. 
166
 KY. CONST. § 233A. 
162
 FLA CONST. Art. I. 
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Louisiana 
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. 
No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution or any state law 
to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a 
union other than the union of one man and one woman. A legal status identical or 
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized. No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall recognize any marriage 
contracted in any other jurisdiction which is not the union of one man and one woman to the 
state constitution.167 
Michigan 
To secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society and for future generations of 
children, the union of one man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement 
recognized as a marriage or similar union for any purpose.168 
Mississippi 
Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of this state only between a man 
and a woman. A marriage in another state or foreign jurisdiction between persons of the 
same gender, regardless of when the marriage took place, may not be recognized in this state 
and is void and unenforceable under the laws of this state.169 
Missouri 
That to be valid and recognized in this state, a marriage shall exist only between a man and a 
woman.170 
Montana 
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage 
in this state. 
North Dakota 
Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. No other domestic 
union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or 
substantially equivalent effect. 
167
 LA. CONST. Art. XII, §15. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a state district judge’s ruling striking down the 
amendment on the grounds that it violated a provision of the state constitution requiring that an amendment cover only 
one subject. The Court found that each provision of the amendment is germane to the single object of defense of 
marriage and constitutes an element of the plan advanced to achieve this object. Forum for Equality PAC v. McKeithen, 
893 So. 2d 715 (La., 2005). 
168
 MI. CONST., Art. 1, Sec. 25. 
169
 MISS. CONST. §263-A. 
170
 MO. CONST., Art. I, Sect. 33. 
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Ohio 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by 
this state and its political subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not 
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage. 
Oklahoma 
Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. Neither this 
constitution nor any other provision of law shall be construed to require that marital status or 
the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups. A marriage 
between persons of the same gender performed in another state shall not be recognized as 
valid and binding in this state as of the date of the marriage. Any person knowingly issuing a 
marriage license in violation of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.171 
Oregon 
It is the policy of Oregon, and its political subdivisions, that only a marriage between one 
man and one woman shall be valid or legally recognized as a marriage.172 
South Carolina 
Marriage in the state of South Carolina, and its political subdivisions, is exclusively defined 
as a union between one man and one woman; all other attempted or putative unions, 
including those recognized by other jurisdictions are void ab initio.173 
South Dakota 
Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or recognized in South Dakota. 
The uniting of two or more persons in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other quasi-
marital relationship shall not be valid or recognized in South Dakota.174 
Tennessee 
The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one man and one 
woman shall be the only legally recognized marital contract in this state. Any policy or law 
or judicial interpretation, purporting to define marriage as anything other than the historical 
institution and legal contract between one man and one woman, is contrary to the public 
policy of this state and shall be void and unenforceable in Tennessee. If another state or 
foreign jurisdiction issues a license for persons to marry and if such marriage is prohibited in 
OKLA. CONST. Art. II, §35. 
OR. CONST. Art. XV, §5a. 
SC CONST. Art. XVII, §15. 
SD CONST. Art. XXI, §9. 
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this state by the provisions of this section, then the marriage shall be void and unenforceable 
in this state.175 
Texas 
Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one woman. This state 
or a political subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status identical or 
similar to marriage.176 
Utah 
Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. No other domestic 
status or union, however denominated, between persons is valid or recognized or may be 
authorized, sanctioned or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect as a 
marriage.177 
Virginia 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in or recognized by 
this Commonwealth and its political subdivisions. This Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance, or effects of 
marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its political subdivisions create or recognize 
another union, partnership, or other legal status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, 
obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage.178 
Wisconsin 
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage 
in this state. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried 
individuals shall not be valid or recognized in this state.179 
175
 TN CONST. Art. XI, §3. 
176
 TX CONST. Art. 1, §32. 
177
 UTAH CONST. Art. I, §29. 
178
 VA CONST. Art. I, §15-A. 
179
 WI CONST. Art. XIII, §3. 
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Table 1. State Statutes Defining “Marriage” 
State Statute Marriage Definitiona Non-Recognition 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2003) 
Alaska ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011 (2003) 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (2003) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (2003) 
California Judicial Interpretation 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2003) 
Connecticut Judicial Interpretation 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit.13 § 101 (2002) 
Florida FLA. STAT. Ch. 741.04 (2002) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (2002) 
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572-1 (2003) 
Idaho* IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (2003) 
Illinois* 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/201 (2003) 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (2003) 
Iowa IOWA CODE § 595.2 (2003) 
Kansas* KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2002) 
Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (2002) 
Louisiana LA. CIV. CODE art. 86 (2003) 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 19, § 701 (2003) 
Maryland Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law § 2-201 (2002) 
Massachusetts Judicial Interpretation 
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws § 551.1 (2003) 
Minnesota MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2002) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2003) 
Missouri* MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (2003) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-103 (2002) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 1, § 29 (2002) 
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §122.020 (2003) 
New Hampshire N . H . Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:2 (2002) 
New Jersey Judicial Interpretation 
New Mexico N . M . STAT. ANN § 40-1-1 (2002) 
New York Judicial Interpretation 
North Carolina N .C . GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2003) 
North Dakota N . D . CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (2002) 
Ohio* Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3101 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 43 § 3.1 (2003) 
X 
X 
X 
Xb 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Xd 
X 
X 
Xe 
X 
Xf 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Xg 
Xh 
X i 
Xj 
X 
Xk 
X 
X 
Xc 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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State Statute Marriage Definitiona Non-Recognition 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2001) 
Pennsylvania* PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1704 (2002) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-1 (2002) 
South Carolina* S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (2002) 
South Dakota S. D . Codified Laws § 25-1-1 (2002) 
Tennessee* TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-113 (2003) 
Texas Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 2.001 (2002) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (2003) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 8 (2003) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (2003) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (2003) 
West Virginia W . VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2003) 
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 765.01 (2002) 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. § 20-1-101 (2003) 
Puerto Rico P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 221 (2002) 
X l 
Xm 
X 
X 
X 
Xn 
X 
Xo 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Notes: States in bold have constitutional amendments prohibiting same-sex marriage. States marked with an 
asterisk have a statute establishing same-sex unions as a violation of the state’s public policy. 
a. Marriage consists of a contract between one man and one woman. 
b. In In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Ca. 2008), the court held that the state’s constitution guarantees 
the basic right to civil marriage to all individuals and couples regardless of their sexual orientation. In 
November 2008, voters approved a constitutional amendment which recognizes as valid marriages 
unions of heterosexual couples. On May 26, 2009, the court found the ban is a permissible and valid 
amendment under the state’s constitution. Strauss v. Horton, 2009 WL 1444594 (Ca. May 26, 2009). 
c. In Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008), the court held that laws 
restricting civil marriage to heterosexual couples violate the state’s equal protection provision. 
d. In Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009), the court held that laws restricting civil marriage to 
heterosexual couples violate the state’s Equal Protection Clause. 
e. On May 6, 2009, Maine’s governor signed a bill legalizing same-sex marriages. However, in November 
2009, voters overruled the law. 
f. The Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted “marriage,” within Massachusetts’ statutes, “as the union of 
one man and one woman.” Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993). However, in Goodridge v. Dept. of 
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), the court construed the term “marriage” to mean the 
voluntary union of two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others. 
g. On June 4, 2009, New Hampshire’s governor signed a bill legalizing same-sex marriages. 
h. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state’s constitution requires that same-sex couples be 
granted the same rights as married heterosexual couples. The Court left the definition of marriage to the 
legislature. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 2006). On December 15, 2006, the legislature declined to 
expand the term “marriage” to include same sex couples. Instead, the legislature created a civil union 
status for same-sex couples effective February 2007. 
i. Marriage is a civil contract requiring consent of parties. 
j . Marriage has been traditionally defined as the voluntary union of one man and one woman as husband 
and wife. See, for example, Fisher v. Fisher, 250 N.Y. 313, 165 N. E. 460 (1929). A basic assumption, 
therefore, is that one of the two parties to the union must be male and the other must be female. On 
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the basis of this assumption, the New York courts have consistently viewed it essential to the formation 
of a marriage that the parties be of opposite sexes. 
k. Effective May 7, 2004. 
l. Marriage is a civil contract entered into in person by males at least 17 years of age and females at least 17 
years of age, who are otherwise capable, and solemnized in accordance with ORS 106.1. 
m. Men are forbidden to marry kindred. 
n. On April 7, 2009, Vermont became the first state to legalize same-sex marriages legislatively. State 
legislatures garnered a sufficient number of votes to override the governor’s veto. 
o. Marriage, so far as its validity at law is concerned, is a civil contract, to which the consent of the parties 
capable in law of contracting is essential, and which creates the legal status of husband and wife. 
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